Notes on PI - Preface

Compared with the Preface of the Tractatus the Preface of PI shows some striking similarities as well as differences. (I'll refer to the former as 'Preface#1' , to the latter as ' Preface#2'.) I'm sure I'm not the first to notice these but it seems useful to try and collect them in one place: it might turn out that Preface#2 itself "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of [W.'s] old way of thinking." Most introductions to the Investigations emphasize its reactive nature (see e.g. Schroeder 2006, p. 123). I think it can be nicely demonstrated with the (obviously restricted) example of the Prefaces that, on the one hand, there are some persistent features and how, on the other hand, the reaction happens on a performative level as well. (Not closely related to the Preface but still important to note here, as e.g. (Lugg 2000, p. 7) does, that the motto of PI taken from Nestroy's Der Schützling didn't make it to the monolingual English edition.)

Let's take the similarities first. In both cases W. defines the target audience: readers who gain pleasure from reading and understanding the book (Preface#1) and readers whose thoughts are fertilized by the ones contained in the book (Preface#2). (It might be worth noting here that W. throughout his life remained fairly confident that no one really understood what he was doing.)
In both cases W. mentions a few influential thinkers to whom he's indebted (Frege and Russell in Preface#1 and Ramsey and Sraffa in Preface#2) but, more interestingly, he is quick to add that "it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by someone else" (Preface#1), and that "[i]f my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine, - I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as my property" (Preface#2). (I believe that in that background of these huffy remarks we might expect to find a wound sustained from academia in 1914 when his notes on logic weren't accepted as a BA thesis for lack of a Preface (!) and notes. For more on this see for example McGuinness 2008, letter no. 41 to G. E. Moore, 7.5.1914, p. 73)
Another interesting feature shared by both Prefaces is the author's dissatisfaction with his work. In the case of the Tractatus the dissatisfaction has two sources: (1) that in the end the solutions offered in the book show "how little is achieved when these problems are solved" (note that this is not so much a shortcoming on W.'s side but rather a shortcoming of philosophy) and (2) that he hasn't always managed to find the best way of expressing his ideas (to hit the nail exactly on the head). The second (more substantial) worry has its counterpart in Preface#2 in the extended album-metaphor: the effects of poor (or, at best, mediocre) draughtsmanship take the place of failing to hit the nail exactly on the head. This, together with admitting that despite his best efforts he was unable to weld his results into a whole in which the thoughts "proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks", I think, explains why the Investigations, according to W., is not a good book.

The most striking (and most significant) difference between the two Prefaces, I think, are the radically different emphases. While in the Tractatus we get a fairly comprehensive summary and evaluation of the main aims, means and results of the book (e.g. the genesis of philosophical problems, the sense/nonsense dichotomy, the importance of finding the solution for all significant questions etc.), such things are hardly mentioned in Preface#2 . Instead of substantial claims regarding the content of the Investigations what we have here nothing more than a short and incomplete list of to-be-discussed subjects ("the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things"). Apart from this one sentence the rest of the Preface consists entirely of formal considerations. W. talks about the reasons for, and purposes of writing the book, i.e. quieting his vanity stung by the misuse/misunderstanding of his work, the discovery of "grave mistakes" in the Tractatus, the wish to "bring light into one brain or another" and to stimulate readers to their own thoughts.
Finally and perhaps most importantly W. confesses that despite his best efforts the best he could write "would never be more than philosophical remarks." The album-like nature of the Investigations is, according to the author, "connected with the very nature of the investigation." It is temping to understand this as a reference to the diverse list of contents quoted earlier (the concepts of meaning, understanding, proposition etc.), but I don't think this is the case. It seems to me that we have here a preliminary remark on method. That is to say the fragmented nature of the Investigations is far from being a result of the diversity of its subject matter: in fact W. himself says that "[t]he same or almost the same points were always being approached".